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FREE RIDERS AT THE DRUGSTORE: 
GENERICS, CONSUMER CONFUSION, AND THE 
PUBLIC GOOD 
 
Kelley Clements Keller, Esq.* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
If success is said to breed imitation, then to the business person imitation 
is the highest form of flattery.1 Or is it? 
 
The enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 19842 radically changed the 
opportunities for market entry by generic drug manufacturers. By allowing 
generic companies to seek Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for 
their products prior to the expiration of the brand-name drug’s patent,3 it became 
possible for the generic alternative to be made available to consumers the very 
day the pioneer drug’s patent expires.4 While this accelerated market entry has 
achieved the intended consequence of providing reduced-cost drug options for 
consumers at the earliest possible time, the financial ramifications for the 
  
 Copyright © 2013, Kelley Clements Keller; Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
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Clerks with The Keller Law Firm, LLC., spent hours cite checking and assisting with the 
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 1 SmithKline Beckman Corp. v. Pennex Prods. Co., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 746, 748 (E.D. 
Pa. 1985). 
 2 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b–68c, 70b (2012); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 
355, 360cc (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2006)). 
 3 The Hatch-Waxman Act created the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) 
process, which allows a generic manufacturer to rely on efficacy data provided by the 
branded manufacturer before bringing its product to market and greatly reduces the time 
to market. Id. 
 4 Sarah E. Eurek, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market Entry of Generic 
Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 18–19 (2003); see 
also Shawn Tully, Why Drug Prices Will Go Lower, FORTUNE, May 3, 1993, at 56. 
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research pharmaceutical companies that develop the branded drugs has been 
inestimable.5 By losing market exclusivity so soon after patent expiration,6 
research pharmaceutical companies must employ other strategies, such as 
building brand recognition, to protect their market position and perpetuate a 
particular drug’s profitability. By developing the reputation and goodwill of a 
national brand, these companies are able to capitalize on consumer loyalty and 
patients’ desires for consistency and quality in their medications. 
Protecting and perpetuating profits is essential to a pharmaceutical 
company’s economic health and survival. These profits help provide the 
requisite capital for future research and development efforts, allowing 
pharmaceutical companies to continue developing pioneer drugs. However, even 
after overcoming the barriers to profitability involved in bringing drugs to 
market, many national brand drugs fail to become profitable.7 To mitigate the 
impact of generic competition, these research companies rely on the success of 
national direct-to-consumer advertising campaigns and branding strategies to 
build goodwill and earn consumer loyalty toward their branded drugs.8 As part 
of this strategy, pharmaceutical companies more frequently seek to build source-
identifying significance in various properties of the drugs themselves, such as 
the color, shape, and texture, rather than merely promote the manufacturing 
source of the drug. 
As an example of the significance of these properties, although Procter & 
Gamble Co.’s identity as the manufacturer of Pepto-Bismol® may not be 
generally known to the public, consumers readily associate a pink-colored liquid 
for stomach relief with the brand Pepto-Bismol®.9 Likewise, AstraZeneca 
markets Nexium® (a successor medication to Prilosec®) as “The Purple Pill.”10 
The entire branding strategy for Nexium®, a treatment for acid reflux disease, is 
built around the purple color of the pill.11 Arguably, it is the recognition and 
association of these properties with a particular product—as opposed to the 
  
 5 Stacey L. Schreiber, Dollars and Senses: Pharmaceutical Product Design is 
Becoming Vivid (Apr. 2003), (unpublished, Harvard University DASH repository) (on 
file with the ckjip),  http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8846778/ 
Dollars_and_Senses.pdf (“A 1998 Congressional Budget Office Study found that since 
the enactment of Hatch-Waxman, the generic market share rose from 18.6% to 42.6%.”). 
“This study examined drugs that comprise approximately 70% of prescription drug sales 
through retail pharmacies and considered drugs in the form of ‘easily countable units.’” 
Id. at 4 n.4 (quoting Melissa C. Popolillo, Government Study Reveals Generics’ Impact 
on Industry, DRUG STORE NEWS, Oct. 19, 1998, at CP20. 
 6 See Eurek, supra note 4, at 18–19. 
 7 Lynn M. Jordan, Naming A Drug in Just One Colour: Trademark Protection for 
Organoleptic Properties of Pharmaceuticals, TRADEMARK WORLD, Mar. 2001, at 28. 
 8 Id. 
 9 See Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 
1959); PEPTO BISMOL, http://www.pepto-bismol.com/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2013). 
 10 See PURPLE PILL, http://www.purplepill.com/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2013). 
 11 Id. 




recognition and association of the product with a particular manufacturer—that 
has the primary impact in building the brand. 
The long-term success of marketing strategies like these depends largely 
on these brands’ ability to enforce proprietary rights in these particular 
properties, individually or collectively, under trademark and unfair competition 
laws.12 However, in the context of prescription pharmaceuticals, various judicial 
decisions have eviscerated the scope of available protection for branded drugs in 
favor of permissible marketing of generic “look-alikes.”13 There appears to be an 
overriding social concern that the public may be implicitly deceived as to the 
quality or efficacy of a generic alternative if it does not mimic the appearance of 
the branded prescription drug. The difficulty lies in striking a balance between 
the competing interests of national brands to trademark protection for source-
identifiers on their products and the rights of generic labels to bring publicly 
accepted substitute drugs to market that earn the public’s trust and confidence. 
Absent a stable and reliable body of law, both branded and generic 
manufacturers may be left with inadequate security or guidance for effective 
business planning with respect to advertising and branding schemes, a situation 
that will inevitably result in costly litigation and contribute to the rising cost of 
drugs. 
This article explores the legal and social tension between the rights of 
national brand research companies to trade dress protection for their pioneer 
prescription drugs and the rights of private label, or generic, brands to market 
“look-alike” drugs once patents for the brands expire. Part I explores the impact 
of a generic brand’s market entry on a national brand and the legal and social 
arguments for and against generic “look-alikes.” Part II discusses the current 
legal standard for achieving exclusive protection for non-traditional source 
identifiers and for enforcing those rights. Part III discusses possible resolutions 
to the generic drug versus brand-name drug conflict. 
  
 12 See generally Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) 
(trademark protection extended to color provided it is nonfunctional and has acquired 
secondary meaning); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1335 (C.C.P.A. 
1982) (trademark protection extends to shape and other product configurations provided 
they are nonfunctional); In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (in 
case of first impression, TTAB found trademark protection extends to flavor provided it 
is nonfunctional and has acquired secondary meaning). 
 13 See Shire US Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 357 (3d Cir. 2003); see also, 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (broadening the reach 
of the functionality doctrine and exempting a larger number of possible trade dresses 
from trademark protection); Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215 
(2000) (holding that product-design trade dress cannot be inherently distinctive but must 
acquire secondary meaning). 
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I. MARKET ENTRY OF GENERIC DRUGES AND ISSUES OF TRADE 
IDENTITY  
“Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 in an effort to promote 
innovation and competition in the pharmaceutical industry.”14 The Act seeks to 
facilitate market entry for generic copies of brand name pharmaceuticals, once 
the branded drug comes off patent protection.15 Under the Act’s Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA) process, “a generic manufacturer can begin 
experimenting on a patented drug before its expiration and seek to market a 
generic version of the patented drug.”16 The ANDA allows “generic 
manufacturers ‘to piggyback on the proprietary safety and effectiveness data 
submitted by the innovator to obtain approval from the [FDA] for the pioneer 
drug’,”17 which significantly reduces the required capital investment by generic 
manufacturers before bringing a “lower-cost alternative” to market.18 In 
bypassing the requirement to develop “safety and efficacy data,” generic 
manufacturers are able to compete more effectively.19 While the purpose of the 
Act is to provide lower-cost alternatives to consumers, the financial impact on 
research companies has been inestimable.20 
Since the passage of the Act, these research companies, who recover their 
research and development (R&D) costs through drug sales, are forced to 
compete against “the proliferation of generic drugs [that] has eroded sales in the 
very market they created.”21 To maintain commercial success and recover their 
R&D costs after generic entry,22 research companies must rely on consumer 
loyalty toward a particular brand given its reputation for quality and consistency. 
To build this brand loyalty, companies spend billions of dollars on marketing 
programs and promotional strategies.23 Therefore, when a generic alternative 
  
 14 Brian Porter, Comment, Stopping The Practice Of Authorized Generics: Mylan’s 
Effort To Close The Gaping Black Hole In The Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 177, 178 (2005). 
 15 Id. at 178. 
 16 Id. at 179. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 179–80. 
 19 Id. at 179. 
 20 Schreiber, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing impact on brand-name market share upon 
generic entry to market). 
 21 Jordan, supra note 7, at 28. Consumer demand for generic drugs results from the 
assumption that they represent an equally effective, but less expensive, version of the 
national brand. It is the consumer’s association of a generic drug with the brand identity 
of the pharmaceutical drug that compels its purchase. In fact, consumers often purchase 
generics on the mistaken belief they are manufactured by the pharmaceutical brand itself. 
See id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Schreiber, supra note 5 (“In the year 2000, pharmaceutical companies spent $2.5 
billion on such marketing in the United States, and several promotional strategies aimed 
at the public have focused on appearance as well as function.”). 




mimics the branded drug’s appearance, research companies believe the generic 
product “free rides” on the national brand’s hard-earned reputation and 
goodwill. It is precisely this circumstance that the trademark and unfair 
competition laws were designed to prevent. 
Conversely, generic manufacturers argue that disallowing their products 
to mimic their branded counterparts is detrimental to patients and frustrates the 
purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act. In SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical 
Labs., the generic manufacturer argued in favor of producing products that 
mimic brand-name drugs as they are desirable “to facilitate identification of a 
particular medication of a particular strength”;24 “that the standardization of 
color, size, and shape is important to both ensure that the proper drug is 
dispensed and to assist in rapid identification of medications in emergency 
situations”;25 that physicians may become “confused when trying to visually 
identify a prescription drug”;26 and that patients feel more confident taking a 
generic product when they believe it is chemically identical to the brand-name 
counterpart.27 In essence, if the generic substitute does not look like the branded 
drug, then “patient confusion, resistance and anxiety will result.”28 
SK&F’s counter-arguments are illustrative of the position pharmaceutical 
companies generally take on this issue. As for the identification of drugs, SK&F 
submitted “testimony of physicians who stated that they would never rely upon 
trade dress as the sole means of identifying a prescription drug”;29 that patients 
would not reject generic drugs that do not mimic their brand-name counterparts 
as inferior because “most states require that a patient be informed of a generic 
substitution”;30 and finally, that because generic drugs may not be chemically 
identical to the national brand, assuming the same trade dress may send a 
deceptive message to the consumer.31 Because generic substitutes may differ in 
efficacy and absorption rates, to permit virtually indistinguishable generic “look-
alikes” on the market runs the risk that a patient may unwittingly ingest a drug 
of potentially lower quality, one that has a different absorption rate in the 
bloodstream, or one that has different inactive ingredients that could potentially 
  
 24 Aaron M. Pile, What’s in Your Bottle?: Shire US Inc. v. Barr Laboratories Inc. and 
its Effect of Prescription Drug Trade Dress Protection in the Third Circuit, 5 U. PITT. J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2004) (quoting SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 
F.2d 1055, 1060 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
7:50 (4th ed. 2001). 
 29 Pile, supra note 24, at 10. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
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harm the consumer.32 Further, when product features have nothing to do with the 
utilitarian performance of the product (they have no biological, scientific, or 
medicinal value to the underlying product and do not contribute to the 
workability of the medication), they should always be available for commercial 
exploitation and protected under existing laws. 
Indisputably, market entry of a generic drug profoundly impacts the 
pharmaceutical brand’s market share. Given Congress’ and the FDA’s efforts to 
facilitate consumer trust and confidence in generic substitutions, the question of 
permissible “look-alikes” is laden with legal and public policy concerns. Both 
generic manufacturers and branded-drug manufacturers have numerous 
arguments in support of and against trade dress identity for generic drugs, and 
neither side appears to be retreating from its position any time soon. 
II. LEGAL PROTECTION FOR ORGANOLEPTIC PROPERTIES OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 
“Every drug that goes to market has organoleptic properties.”33 
Organoleptic properties comprise those product features that may be perceived 
by the senses, such as color, shape, taste, and aroma.34 Because these product 
features may be legally protectable by trademark and unfair competition laws,35 
pharmaceutical companies are able to exploit them as product source identifiers 
and build branding schemes around them.36 However, this protection is not 
without limitation. As with more traditional source identifiers, organoleptic 
properties may receive federal trademark protection only if “they are both 
nonfunctional and distinctive of the applicant’s goods.”37 
  
 32 The FDA requires generic drugs be “identical -- or bioequivalent -- to a brand name 
drug in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance 
characteristics and intended use.” Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers 
/questionsanswers/ucm100100.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). According to the 
Supreme Court, generic drugs are bioequivalent “if, when administered in equal amounts 
to the same individual, they reach general circulation at the same relative rate and to the 
same relative extent.” Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 848 n.5 
(1982) (citing REMINGTON’S PHARMACEUTICAL SCIENCES 1368 (Arthur Osol & John E. 
Hoover eds., 15th ed. 1975)). Nonetheless, “name brand pharmaceutical companies may 
claim that their products remain superior due to an even higher quality standard than 
required by the government regulator.” Schreiber, supra note 5, at 3 n.1 (citing Am. 
Home Prods. Corp. v. Chelsea Labs., Inc., 572 F. Supp. 278, 280 (D.N.J. 1982)). 
 33 Jordan, supra note 7. 
 34 See Organoleptic Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/ 
browse/organoleptic (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). 
 35 Jordan, supra note 7; see Organoleptic, supra note 34. 
 36 Jordan, supra note 7; see Organoleptic, supra note 34. 
 37 Jordan, supra note 7; see Organoleptic, supra note 34. 




Product manufacturers may seek trademark protection for individual 
product features per se, such as color38 or flavor,39 or alternatively, they may 
seek protection for the overall product configuration, which encompasses a 
product’s trade dress.40 Generally, a product’s trade dress refers to the overall 
product design or packaging which serves to identify the product’s source.41 The 
Supreme Court has broadly construed the realm of protectability as anything 
“human beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ … that is capable of carrying 
meaning.”42 Trade dress, according to the Court, “involves the total image of a 
product and may include features such as size, shape, color or color 
combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”43 As 
mentioned, however, to qualify for legal protection, the Court has stated (1) that 
a particular trade dress must be either inherently distinctive, or distinctive as a 
result of acquiring “secondary meaning;” (2) that there must be a likelihood of 
consumer confusion between the original producer’s trade dress and the later 
producer’s trade dress; and (3) that the original producer’s trade dress must be 
nonfunctional.44 
Product trade dress plays a uniquely important role in the commercial 
success of pharmaceutical products, and particularly for prescription drugs. A 
consumer may easily distinguish between over-the-counter brand-name drugs 
and the generic alternatives at the point of purchase, because they are sold 
directly to consumers in unique packaging bearing the manufacturer’s marks and 
designs. 
However, the same is not true for prescription drugs. Pharmacists 
dispense the drugs to consumers in vials or packages without any unique 
markings, so the product design is the only means by which a patient may 
distinguish one medication from another. Similarly, numerous courts have 
distinguished prescription and over-the-counter drugs on the ground that a 
consumer makes a conscious choice between the national brand and the generic 
alternative based on packaging alone, well before inspecting the product itself.45 
With respect to prescription medications, the specific properties of the actual 
pill—size, shape, color, and texture—are “the only indication of source 
available to a patient, who is the ultimate consumer of prescription 
medication.”46 As such, protecting these source-identifying features in their 
  
 38 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161 (1995). 
 39 In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1639, 1648 (T.T.A.B. 2006). 
 40 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 205, 209 (2000). 
 41 Id.; see also Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012); Jordan, supra note 7. 
 42 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 209. 
 43 Pile, supra note 24 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 
n.1 (1992)). 
 44 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 209. 
 45 Whether point-of-consumption confusion or post-sale confusion may be an issue in 
the context of over-the-counter drugs is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 46 Pile, supra note 24. 
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prescription drug products is very important to pharmaceutical companies, 
particularly to combat unfair competition from generic manufacturers who enter 
the market under deceptively similar trade dress. 
Federal unfair competition law, codified in the Lanham Act, creates a 
private cause of action for various forms of infringement of trade identity, 
including traditional trademark and trade dress infringement.47 Notably, Section 
43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act states: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any 
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, 
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representa-
tion of fact, which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to de-
ceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such per-
son with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or ap-
proval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or 
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activi-
ties, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or 
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.48 
Section 43(a)(3) clarifies the reach of 43(a) to include a private cause of action 
for unauthorized third-party use of trade dress.49 
A. The Element of Distinctiveness: Inherent or Acquired 
Marks are organized into a classification system, ranging from weakest to 
strongest. Protectable marks may be inherently distinctive of a particular 
product, or they may acquire distinctiveness, or secondary meaning, through 
consumer recognition.50 Trademark law only grants protection to those source 
identifiers that are distinctive of the underlying goods or services,51 unlike 
generic terms, or those that actually identify the product, which are the weakest 
of all marks and are not protectable by trademark. Marks that have no meaning 
other than that of a source-identifier, where their “intrinsic nature serves to 
identify a particular source,”52 are deemed inherently distinctive and accorded 
the broadest scope of protection. Such marks are classified as suggestive, 
arbitrary or fanciful. 
  
 47 Lanham Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Pile, supra note 24 (introducing categories of distinctiveness (citing Abercrombie 
& Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976))). 
 52 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). 




Suggestive marks merely “suggest” a quality of the underlying goods or 
services, but do not readily invoke the image of the product in the mind of the 
consumer without the imagination.53 Well-known suggestive marks include The 
North Face® for outerwear and The Home Depot® for home improvement 
products and services. Arbitrary marks are known words used in a purely 
arbitrary manner, such as Amazon® for a bookstore and Camel® for cigarettes. 
Fanciful marks, the strongest of all trademarks, are coined words having no-
meaning other than that of a product name. Examples include ExxonMobil® for 
petroleum and Kodak® for photography goods and services. 
Alternatively, descriptive marks, which convey “an immediate idea of the 
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods,” are not inherently 
distinctive.54 They may, however, achieve protectability upon acquiring 
secondary meaning by showing that the consumer associates the mark with a 
particular source,55 though this level of protection is of a narrower scope. 
Secondary meaning may be proved by submitting evidence relating to the 
following four (4) factors: “(1) [t]he length and manner of use; (2) the nature 
and extent of advertising and promotion; (3) the efforts made by the plaintiff to 
promote a conscious connection in the public’s mind between the name and the 
plaintiff’s … business; and (4) the extent to which the public actually identifies 
the name with the plaintiff’s [goods or] service[s].”56 
Unlike traditional word marks, product features and trade dress are not as 
easily categorized according to this classification system. As evidence of this 
difficulty, the courts were split for many years as to whether trade dress could 
ever be inherently distinctive or protected only upon achieving secondary 
meaning. In 1992, the Supreme Court resolved the question in Two Pesos, Inc. v. 
Taco Cabana by construing the distinctiveness element of Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act to allow for the possibility of a product’s trade dress to be 
inherently distinctive and thus “capable of identifying the source of the product, 
thereby rendering unnecessary the requirement of establishing secondary 
meaning.”57 The court reasoned this to be the proper holding because 
“[e]ngrafting onto § 43(a) a requirement of secondary meaning for inher-
ently distinctive trade dress … would undermine the purposes of the Lan-
ham Act given Congress’ intent in passing the Lanham Act. Protection of 
trade dress, no less than of trademarks, serves the Act’s purpose to secure 
  
 53 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, §11:67; Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 
390 F.3d 158, 163, (2d Cir. 2004) (“A suggestive mark is one that suggests that product, 
though it may take imagination to grasp the nature of the product.”). 
 54 MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 11:67 (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & 
Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
 55 See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (2012); see also Investacorp, Inc. 
v. Arabian Investment Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 56 Investacorp, 931 F.2d at 1525 (quoting Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 
1513, (11th Cir.1984)). 
 57 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775. 
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to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the 
ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers. National 
protection of trademarks is desirable, Congress concluded, because trade-
marks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the 
producer the benefits of good reputation.”58 
In 2000, eight (8) years after Two Pesos, the Court revisited the 
distinctiveness element of trade dress in Wal-Mart v. Samara Bros.59 In 
considering an infringement action for unregistered trade dress60 covering 
clothing designs, the Wal-Mart court distinguished the Two Pesos holding on the 
ground that although Two Pesos “unquestionably establishe[d] the legal 
principle that trade dress can be inherently distinctive,” it did not establish that 
every species of trade dress, and specifically product-design trade dress, can be 
inherently distinctive.61 Because the trade dress at issue in Two Pesos, restaurant 
décor, did not constitute product-design trade dress, the Court held that product-
design trade dress cannot be inherently distinctive, but must acquire secondary 
meaning to qualify for trade dress protection.62 
Trade dress protection with regard to prescription drugs is limited to the 
organoleptic properties of the pills, themselves, as they generally lack unique 
product packaging. Applying Two Pesos to prescription drugs, courts have 
considered numerous factors in determining whether products have acquired 
secondary meaning.63 To assess whether a drug’s unique appearance has 
achieved secondary meaning,64 courts have considered “factors such as 
  
 58 Id. at 774. 
 59 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 205 (2000). 
 60 Unregistered marks may serve as the basis for a § 43(a) claim for trademark or 
trade dress infringement. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). However, “plaintiff using §43(a) as 
a basis for a claim of infringement of an unregistered mark is unaided by any 
presumption of validity attaching to a federally registered mark.” MCCARTHY, supra note 
28, § 27.18. 
 61 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 205. 
 62 Id. See generally Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992). 
 63 This standard is inapplicable in the context of over-the-counter medications since 
they are generally sold in specific packaging, which is separate and distinct from the 
product itself. 
 64 Schreiber, supra note 5; see Florida Breckenridge, Inc. v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17574, at *11–15, 43 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1878 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 
1997) (finding that while the overall appearance is distinctive and arbitrary, third party 
use of similar combinations weighs against a finding of inherently distinctive trade 
dress). 




extensive sales of a product with a particular trade dress,65 extensive 
marketing,66 widespread distribution of starter kits,67 and consumer surveys.”68 
Courts have also found that competitor copying of the branded drug’s trade 
dress may provide sufficient or strong evidence of secondary meaning. In Ciba-
Geigy v. Bolar Pharm. Co., the “district court reasoned that a product’s 
appearance would not be copied if it had no value, and it is this value that 
translates into secondary meaning.” 69 In Par Pharmaceutical v. Searle 
Pharmaceuticals, the court stated that copying alone may be insufficient to show 
secondary meaning, albeit constituting strong evidence thereof.70 
B. Likelihood of Confusion 
The cornerstone of trademark infringement is whether consumers are 
likely to be confused or deceived as to the source or sponsorship of a particular 
product in the marketplace.71 Like other product designers, research 
pharmaceutical companies find themselves in a perpetual battle with generic 
manufacturers who sell “look-alike,” or confusingly similar, products and 
undercut their market share. Because consumers tend to draw conclusions 
regarding the source of products from the “producers’ marks and packaging … 
[and] … through the appearance of the products themselves,”72 when a third-
  
 65 Schreiber, supra note 5, at 7; see also Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Chelsea Labs., 
Inc., 572 F. Supp. 278, 281 (D.N.J. 1982) (finding that unique trade dress plus long 
usage, alone, can establish secondary meaning); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1095, 1113 (D.N.J. 1982) (finding that the blue and white opaque 
capsules and pink and white opaque capsules were sufficiently recognizable and had 
attained secondary meaning (citing Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 675 
F.2d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1982))). 
 66 Schreiber, supra note 5, at 8; see Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne 
Labs., 532 F. Supp. 1040, 1056 (D.N.J. 1980) (ruling that marketing expenses of over 
$15 million promoting both the drug’s trademark and orange-colored, smoothly rounded 
biconvex trade dress was “highly persuasive evidence” of secondary meaning); Par 
Pharm., Inc., v. Searle Pharm., Inc., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16648, at *7–8, 227 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 1024, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1985) (holding that evidence of a $2,000,000 spent of 
marketing of a particular blue-colored tablet was one of several factors which made a 
claim of secondary meaning likely to succeed at trial). 
 67 See McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Granutec, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 198, 202 (E.D.N.C. 1995). 
 68 Schreiber, supra note 5. 
 69 Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 747 F.2d 844, 856–57 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(demonstrating the temporal legal argument that secondary meaning may be evinced 
when a valuable product appearance is copied). 
 70 Schreiber, supra note 5, at 9; see Par Pharm, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16648, at *9–
10; see also McNeil-PPC, 919 F. Supp. at 202 (holding that copying alone leads only to a 
presumption of secondary meaning, but evidence of copying plus a survey of secondary 
meaning would likely succeed to show secondary meaning in a trial on the merits). 
 71 Lanham Act § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012). 
 72 Schreiber, supra note 5. 
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party producer copies the appearance, or trade dress, of the original producer’s 
product, the imitation is likely to cause consumer confusion as to its source or 
“cause consumers falsely to assume an affiliation between the producers. [It is 
t]his potential consumer confusion … that the Lanham Act … seeks to 
prevent.”73 Whether due to medical conditions, such as poor eyesight, or merely 
due to inadequate consumer sophistication, it is reasonable to conclude that 
some consumers purchase generics on the mistaken belief they are actually 
manufactured by the same company that produces the pioneer drug.74  
Nearly every judicial circuit has developed a test to decide the confusion 
question, based in most part on the thirteen (13) factors set forth by the Federal 
Circuit in In re E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.75 Some factors of this confusion 
test include the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks or source-identifiers, the 
similarity or dissimilarity of the goods or services on which the marks or source-
identifiers are used, and the similarity or dissimilarity of trade channels for the 
  
 73 Id. at 15, 17. 
 74 Jordan, supra note 7. 
 75 In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The 
thirteen (13) factors are: 
1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appear-
ance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. 
2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as de-
scribed in an application or registration or in connection with which a prior 
mark is in use. 
3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade chan-
nels. 
4) The conditions under which and buyer to whom sales are made, i.e., “im-
pulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing. 
5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use). 
6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods. 
7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion. 
8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has been con-
current use without evidence of actual confusion. 
9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, “fami-
ly” mark, product mark). 
10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark: 
a) a mere “consent” to register or use. 
b) agreement provisions designed to preclude confusion, i.e., limitation 
on continued use of the marks by each party. 
c) assignment of mark, application, registration and good will of the re-
lated business. 
d) laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and indicative 
of lack of confusion. 
11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its 
mark on its goods. 
12) The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial. 
13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use. 




goods or services.76 As a general rule, the more similar the marks, the more 
similar the goods, and the more similar the trade channels, the greater the 
chances a court will find a likelihood of confusion. 
Not surprisingly, courts have often found that a likelihood of confusion 
exists when the generic alternative is identical or highly similar to the national 
brand.77 Under this standard, a generic “look-alike” will nearly always infringe 
the pioneer drug’s trade dress, provided it is both distinctive and nonfunctional. 
When generic brands are brought to market, the underlying products are 
intentionally identical or nearly identical78 to the pioneer brand. In fact, federal 
regulations require therapeutic identity of the products before the generic brand 
can obtain market entry.79 Therefore, when applying the confusion test to 
branded drugs and generic drugs, because the underlying goods (drugs) and 
trade channels (dispensed by pharmacists) are the same, when the products have 
identical or highly similar distinctive trade dresses, the test necessarily demands 
a finding of a likelihood of confusion.80 
This inevitability poses an interesting issue unique to the prescription 
drug industry. Generic manufacturers have asserted several arguments that the 
medicinal identity of the generic substitute should extend beyond 
bioequivalence to the overall appearance of the pill, because there is a material 
public benefit to “look-alike” products81 when the consumer associates the pill’s 
appearance with that medicinal identity. First, if national brand manufacturers 
are permitted to monopolize (potentially in perpetuity) the appearance of any 
one particular drug, the generic brand could be barred from copying those 
features. This may be problematic in those instances where there is arguably a 
salutary effect on consumers when generics replicate the look and feel of the 
national brand. Absent an identity of trade dress, consumers may be implicitly 
deceived into believing the generic alternative is inferior, which could 
undermine a patient’s “psychological acceptance” of a generic substitute, 
thereby frustrating the purpose of facilitating public access to generic 
medications.82 
For example, in Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Labs.,83 
the generic manufacturer argued that its product must be similar in appearance 
to the brand-name product in order to avoid patient anxiety arising from 
  
 76 Id. 
 77 Schreiber, supra note 5. 
 78 See Jordan, supra note 7. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Schreiber, supra note 5, at 17 (distinguishing point-of-consumption and point-of-
purchase confusion). 
 81 SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1067 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 82 See generally The Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 83 Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Labs., 532 F. Supp. 1040, 1046 
(D.N.J. 1980). 
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substituting a generic drug for the brand-name drug.84 Such similarities would 
enable patients who take numerous medications to discriminate between them 
based on size, shape, color, and texture. This organoleptic equivalence would 
also facilitate identification of a particular drug in an emergency situation.85 
Given the public interest factor, the relevant question may be the converse 
of the traditional confusion case: whether consumers may be implicitly deceived 
into believing the generic brand is inferior in quality to the national brand unless 
it looks like the original brand, versus whether the generic brand is seeking to 
free-ride on the branded drug’s goodwill or pass itself off as the original brand. 
An affirmative answer may erode the public’s confidence in the less expensive 
generic alternative, an outcome contrary to the public interest. Because the 
likelihood of confusion analysis does not consider this patient acceptance 
argument, in order to avoid a finding of likelihood of confusion, sympathetic 
courts appear to be broadening the application of the functionality doctrine, 
which necessarily reduces the scope of rights national brands may assert in their 
respective trade dresses.86 By finding a wider range of trade dresses functional 
and therefore not protectable under the Lanham Act, fewer generic “look-alikes” 
will be deemed confusingly similar to their corresponding branded drugs and 
may therefore permissibly co-exist with the national brands at market. 
C. Functionality 
In addition to establishing acquired distinctiveness and a likelihood of 
confusion, companies must show their product designs are nonfunctional to 
achieve statutory protection.87 Only nonfunctional product features may be 
protected by trademark or trade dress.88 The functionality doctrine seeks to 
prevent monopolization by manufacturers of useful and publicly desirable 
features, thus pushing these features into the realm of patent protection.89 The 
theory presupposes that allowing one producer to monopolize a useful product 
feature would be tantamount to unfair competition.90 
What constitutes a nonfunctional product feature, however, has become a 
great source of juridical debate. The Supreme Court has handed down few 
decisions on product functionality and none provide a particularly clear roadmap 
  
 84 Id. at 1046–47; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 28. See generally Inwood Labs., 
Inc., v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 847 n.4 (1982). 
 85 Boehringer, 532 F. Supp. at 1046–47. 
 86 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001); see also 
Shire US Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 358–59 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 87 See Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1278–79 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 88 For a discussion of the theories of this doctrine see generally Margreth Barrett, 
Consolidating the Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality: Encountering TrafFix on 
the Way to Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 79 (2004). 
 89 See Valu Eng’g, 278 F.3d at 1273. 
 90 Id. 




for the lower courts.91 Some courts have held that a nonfunctional product 
feature is one that serves no purpose other than source identification,92 while 
others posit a product feature is nonfunctional if it does not need to be used by 
competitors to compete effectively.93 Additionally, some courts have found a 
product feature nonfunctional provided it is not vital to the commercial success 
of the product.94 Moreover, the mixed bag of functionality standards applied in 
district and appellate court decisions is further evidence of this legal minefield.95 
While these various decisions have historically favored branded manufacturers,96 
recent decisions reveal an increased judicial hesitation to granting overly broad 
protection to trade dress. 
In 2001, the Supreme Court’s famous TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. 
Displays, Inc. decision greatly reined in an ever-broadening view of trade dress 
protection for product features and product design by expanding the reach of the 
  
 91 See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33 (court adopted a two-step approach to functionality by 
reaffirming the “traditional rule” of Inwood that a product feature is “functional when it is 
essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the 
device,” and then, if nonfunctional under the traditional rule, a product may still be 
functional if excluding copying would have an anti-competitive effect); Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (in determining whether color per se is 
functional, court expanded the “traditional rule” set forth in Inwood and re-characterized 
it by stating that “‘a product feature is functional … if it is essential to the use or purpose 
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article,’ that is, if exclusive use of the 
feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage”); 
Inwood Labs., Inc., v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982) (although court did 
not reach functionality issue, it stated that “a product feature is functional if it is essential 
to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article,” later 
characterized by the court as the “traditional rule” of functionality); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l 
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) (feature must affect the cost or quality of the 
product to be functional); Barrett, supra note 88, at 85–110. 
 92 Barrett, supra note 88, at 96. 
 93 Id. at 102. 
 94 See Inwood, 456 U.S. at 863 (White, J., concurring). 
 95 See supra notes 91–94. 
 96 See, e.g., SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1060 (3d Cir. 
1980) (adoption of maroon-and-white capsule was arbitrary, having nothing to do with 
the purpose of performance of the drug, or with its processing); A.H. Robins Co. v. Med. 
Chest Corp., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14412, at *3–6, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015, 1018 
(E.D. Mo. 1980) (a round, light-blue tablet, convex on both sides and shiny in 
appearance, is an arbitrary configuration and nonfunctional); Hoffman La Roche, Inc., v. 
Premo Pharm. Lab., Inc., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16851, at *40–41, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
374, 386 (D.N.J. 1980) (the trade dress consisting of the use of a capsule in the distinctive 
color of light green is nonfunctional and does not enhance the efficacy of the 
medication); see also Merck & Co. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 770 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir.) 
(unpublished), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981 (1985) (blue-and-white drug capsule is 
nonfunctional). But see Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 643 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
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functionality doctrine.97 Invoking its decision in Wal-Mart v. Samara Bros. the 
prior year, the court cautioned that “product design almost invariably serves 
purposes other than source identification.”98 In fact, one commentator has 
summarized the Court’s holding as follows: 
“Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in many in-
stances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products. In gen-
eral, unless an intellectual property right such as patent or copyright pro-
tects an item, it will be subject to copying. As the Court has explained, 
copying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which pre-
serve our competitive economy … Allowing competitors to copy will have 
salutary effects in many instances.”99 
Prior to TrafFix, courts generally applied one or more of three (3) general 
standards to determine product feature functionality: the “role of the feature” 
standard, the “practical effect” standard, and the “important ingredient” 
standard.100 The “role of the feature” standard examines the actual role the 
feature plays within the product.101 The strictest approach, this standard finds a 
feature to be functional if it plays a material or important role in the use or 
purpose of the product, or affects the product’s cost or quality.102 As a result, 
only arbitrary or incidental features that serve as source identifiers may be 
protected.103 
The “practical effect” standard differs by precluding the recognition of 
trademark rights only when the particular design at issue affords benefits that are 
not practically available to third-parties through alternative designs.104 This 
standard, which is much more liberal than the “role of the feature” approach, 
evaluates the likely anticompetitive impact of product trade dress protection in 
any given case.105 Courts will deny protection only if it will significantly impair 
competition.106 As a result, features that play a material or important role may 
still be protected by trade dress under this standard, provided no competitive 
impairment arises as a result of prohibiting competitors from copying the 
product feature. 
Historically, the majority of appellate courts and the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office adopted the “practical effect” approach using various 
  
 97 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001) 
(discussing the Sixth Circuit’s expansive view of trade dress); see also Barrett, supra note 
88, at 82–83. 
 98 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Barrett, supra note 88, at 83. 
 101 Id. at 95. 
 102 Id. at 97. 
 103 Id. at 93. 
 104 Id. at 95. 
 105 Id. at 93–94. 
 106 Id. at 95. 




formulations for measuring what constitutes “practical effect.”107 With this 
standard, there appears to be a large emphasis on availability of alternate 
product features that would provide competitors with an equally effective 
product. The famed In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. case is among the 
“practical effect” cases.108 
In Morton-Norwich, the court set forth the distinction between de facto 
functionality and de jure functionality.109 If a product feature is de facto 
functional, although it may have some utility other than source identification, 
e.g. it has some function, it may still be deemed legally nonfunctional and 
therefore protectable.110 However, if a product feature is de jure functional, it 
means that the product has a particular design because it actually works better 
with that design, and as such is deemed legally functional and not protectable.111 
Under Morton-Norwich, to determine whether a product feature is de jure 
functional, a court may apply the following factors: 
(1) the existence of a utility patent disclosing the utilitarian advantages of 
the design; 
(2) advertising materials in which the originator of the design touts the 
design’s utilitarian advantages; 
(3) the availability of competitors of functionally equivalent designs; and 
(4) facts indicating that the design results in a comparatively simple or 
cheap method of manufacturing the product.112 
The “important ingredient” standard inquires whether “the product feature 
at issue is an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product.”113 
This standard is stricter than the “practical effect” standard, and may or may not 
be stricter than the “role of the feature” standard. It is the least used and has 
been highly criticized by numerous courts.114 It places an emphasis on a 
consumer’s perceptions and motivation in purchasing the product at issue rather 
than analyzing the interrelationship of the feature with the product as a whole. 
Despite the majority trend to adopt the “practical effect” standard, the 
TrafFix court adopted the “role of the feature” standard, with a “practical effect” 
analysis to be used as a back-up inquiry to further exclude some product features 
from trade dress protection.115 The court ignores the “important ingredient” 
standard as a reason for a finding of nonfunctionality. This hybrid approach 
  
 107 Id. at 99. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 100. 
 110 Id. at 101. 
 111 In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 112 Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing 
Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1340–41). 
 113 Barrett, supra note 88, at 105 (quoting Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 
339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952)). 
 114 Id. at 104–06. 
 115 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001). 
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favors weak trade dress protection and greatly expands the reach of the 
functionality doctrine. Unfortunately, the court’s inconsistent interpretation of 
product functionality has inevitability caused frustration, confusion, and 
unpredictability with respect to protection of pharmaceutical trade dress. 
The Third Circuit’s 2003 decision in Shire US Inc. v. Barr Laboratories, 
Inc. exemplifies this unpredictability.116 In Shire, the Third Circuit distinguished 
its prior precedent for showing the nonfunctionality of pharmaceutical trade 
dress.117 In affirming the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction 
against a generic drug’s “imitative” coloring of Adderall®,118 the court 
significantly broadened the reach of the functionality doctrine, making it 
increasingly difficult to achieve proprietary rights in pharmaceutical trade 
dress.119 To support its holding that the blue and orange colors of the branded-
drugs “were functional in identifying correct dosage and promoting patient 
acceptance of a generic substitution,”120 the court cited U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions which “caution against the over-extension of trade dress protection”121 
as well as recent FDA amendments that promote the marketing of generic 
substitutions.122 Strangely, the court’s holding, which reversed its prior decision 
in SK&F,123 appears to rest more on its opinion that the physical similarities 
between the generic and brand-name drug “materially benefitted the patient 
population” by promoting patient acceptance rather than an application of the 
legal standard for functionality announced in TrafFix.124 The court’s opinion 
seems to read as if the court wrote to a desired conclusion rather than follow an 
established legal path to a just result. 
This decision significantly undermined the reliability and predictability of 
trade dress jurisprudence. Strangely, the Shire court appears uncharacteristically 
sympathetic to generic manufacturers’ formerly unsuccessful arguments as to 
why trade dress is nearly always functional and therefore available for 
permissible imitation.125 Before Shire, such arguments were routinely rejected.126 
With its decision, the court disrupted settled law and raised numerous legal and 
public policy questions regarding the competing rights and responsibilities of 
brand name companies and their generic bioequivalents. A decade later, these 
questions remain. 
  
 116 Shire US Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 356 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 117 Id.; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 28. 
 118 Shire, 329 F.3d at 359. 
 119 Id. at 353–54. 
 120 MCCARTHY, supra note 28; Shire, 329 F.3d at 357. 
 121 Shire, 329 F.3d at 358. The court also referred to the 1999 Lanham Act amendment 
shifting the burden to prove nonfunctionality of unregistered trade dress to the plaintiff. 
Id. at 354 n.13 (citing 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(3) (2000)). 
 122 Id. 
 123 SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1068 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 124 Shire US Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 359 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 125 See id.; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 28. 
 126 Shire, 329 F.3d at 359; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 28. 




III. POSSIBLE RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT 
This is a classic Mexican stand-off.127 In the post-Shire legal environment, 
generic and branded manufacturers are left without a bright-line rule or 
consistent legal standard regarding the scope of protection available for 
pharmaceutical trade dress. Although Shire stands alone as Third Circuit 
precedent, it announced a policy change that is far more antagonistic to 
pharmaceutical companies than prior decisions. However, given its inherent 
limitations,128 generic manufacturers should be cautious before entering the 
market with a “look-alike” drug. A successful infringement suit could prove 
fatal to a particular product’s commercial viability. For example, 
“[l]osing the battle over a particular color can be costly for a generic man-
ufacturer even above the costs of legal fees and/or damage awards; if a ge-
neric manufacturer receives FDA approval for a look-alike medication 
with certain color dyes and is subsequently barred from manufacturing the 
drug in that color, then the generic must seek FDA re-approval for the 
drug’s different color additives before being able to reenter the market.”129 
Perhaps given the nature of the conflict in this area, traditional trade dress 
protection may be inadequate to ameliorate the concerns of both camps. 
Solutions aimed to bring more stability and predictability in this area range from 
the elimination of trade dress protection for pharmaceuticals altogether to 
customizing the trade dress framework to the prescription drug industry.130 A 
modified approach would exclude prescription pharmaceuticals from the 
traditional trade dress rubric in favor of a sui generis model better suited to the 
prescription drug industry.131 Such a framework would eliminate the 
distinctiveness requirement,132 reduce the role of the functionality 
requirement,133 establish a modified test for determining likelihood of consumer 
  
 127 See Mexican stand-off Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mexicanstand-off (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). 
 128 Inevitably, pharmaceutical companies will seek to distinguish Shire on its facts and 
argue its jurisdictional limitations. 
 129 Schrieber, supra note 5, at 48 (citing Telephone Interview with Robert E. Lee, Jr., 
Asst. Gen. Pat. Coun., Law Div., Eli Lilly & Co. (Jan. 3, 2003)). 
 130 Pile, supra note 24, at 7. 
 131 Id. A new framework would take into consideration the peculiarities and 
idiosyncrasies of the prescription drug industry. 
 132 Id. at 8. Given the period of exclusivity afforded a national brand during the patent 
period, consumers are likely to recognize a particular brand by its specific properties. 
Such recognition would replace the requirement to establish secondary meaning under 
the traditional framework. 
 133 Id. Functionality would be limited to those features that qualify for design patent 
protection. “For example, an improved coating that would allow capsules to be 
swallowed more easily, or could provide more control over the time-release medication, 
may be sufficient to obtain such a patent.” Id. at 20. 
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confusion,134 consider the intent of the generic manufacturer,135 and broaden the 
notification requirement of generic substitutions under applicable state law.136 
While sui generis protection is not a panacea, it may restore balance, 
predictability, and consistency to trade dress jurisprudence. Both research 
pharmaceutical companies and generic manufacturers would have increased 
security and guidance for effective business planning, implementing marketing 
programs, making branding decisions, and considering overall strategies for 
commercial success. 
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to the pharmaceutical market, the expiration of patents on 
brand name drugs, coupled with the production of generic drugs, initiates a 
series of legal questions concerning the trade dress protection accorded 
established brands. If a generic drug organoleptically resembles a branded drug, 
does the generic “piggyback” on the reputation of the branded, creating unfair 
competition and constituting infringement upon the brand’s nonfunctional 
identifiers? If the generic is not allowed to resemble the branded, does the 
dissimilarity negatively impact the consumer’s impression of the generic’s 
efficacy, thus damaging the public good? Does the dissimilarity cause confusion 
in the consumer, negatively impacting a possible salutary effect? Does a strong 
similarity cause confusion in violation of the Lanham Act? 
There are no clear-cut answers to these questions, and the hypothetical 
arguments posed in response to them can quickly become circular, with both 
sides claiming to hold superior legal and social positions. With a lack of 
consistent judicial decisions, further clarification, possibly through a sui generis 
model, is needed for improved predictability and balance. Without dependable 
guidelines, the business models of both national brand and generic 
manufacturers suffer from uncertainty and confusion, resulting in loss of 
security, profits, and quality of service to the consumer.
  
 134 Id. A new likelihood of confusion standard would distinguish between identical and 
similar trade dresses. Where the trade dresses are identical, the traditional analysis would 
apply. However, where the trade dresses are merely similar (yet, potentially confusingly 
so), factors such as bioavailability, or the quantity of active ingredients released into the 
bloodstream, and equivalence of inactive ingredients would be taken into consideration. 
 135 Id. at 9. 
 136 Id. In most states, the law requires consumers be notified before substituting a 
generic brand for a national brand drug. Under this new regime, this notification 
requirement would be expanded to require patients to acknowledge such notification in 
writing. Such a writing may establishing prima facie an absence of confusion. 
